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1. INTRODUCTION
The claim that education ought to be directed to the cultivation of virtues 
enjoys both venerable precedent and growing contemporary popularity. Many 
contemporary philosophical virtue theorists have begun to restore the sense of 
an intimacy between virtue, character, and “the good life,” and, in turn, philos-
ophers of education explore the ways that educational practice could contrib-
ute to the cultivation of virtuous character. Certainly many philosophers and 
educationalists will agree with Ben Kotzee that it is “obvious” that education 
ought to “form good intellectual character” (2014, p. 8). I am sympathetic to 
this claim, but also sensitive to the worries of those skeptics who ask about 
the practical, pedagogical, and philosophical issues it raises. Central among 
these concerns of such skeptics is what sorts of virtues should be educated for, 
8OOb²8obYFË½}bn8O½½}8½È²½Âbb½}Oµ½µ8Ybµ½buµ½µ}8Èb
Yb½obY8Ynnb²bYObÊ8OOÂ½µnµ8ËO8YY8½bÈ²½Âbµ¢
My purpose in this chapter is to contribute to the revival of aretaic con-
ceptions of education, but in a way sensitive to those skeptics’ concerns. 
Ê²bµµËVnnb²88OOÂ½n½}bµbOoOÈ²½Âbn½bbO½Â8}Â½ËV
then show its integral role in a range of familiar educational practices and 
OOb²µV8Yo8ËYbµO²Fb}ÉOb²½8b½²bO}bYbYÂO8½88½½½ÂYbµ
and conceptions marginalize or militate against the cultivation and exercise 
of this virtue. The chapter ends by suggesting that educational attitudes, 
practices, and systems can be appraised according to the extent to which 
they are conducive to the cultivation and exercise of virtues and vices: or 
more simply, whether they are edifying or corrupting.
Ðµ8o8O8Èb8½Fbn²bFbuuV¯µ½²boÊu½b²µµÂO}8µ¬O-
oYbOb­8Y¬}Â½Ë­É½}½}b½b²¬½bbO½Â8V­8²½Ën²²b8µµn
brevity, and partly because repetition dulls the mind.
2. CONFIDENCE AND HUMILITY
ËO8µ½}8½}Â½Ëµ8È²½Âbn²½}b88ubb½nOoYbOb¢Ð½
o²µ½u8ObV ½}Âu}V ½}µu}½ µÂYYY¢,ËO8ËboYµ ½}8½ ½}bµb
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½É§Â8½bµ8²bO½²8µ½bYÉ½}b8½}b²¢ÐOoYb½b²µb²8½bµ
with a sense of assumptive capability, unlike their humble peer who demurs, 
}bµ½8½bµV8YÂµF8O¢+b}µ}b²µ}8ÈbOYobY½}µO½²8µ½FË
b½}b²YbµO²FuOoYbOb8Y}Â½Ë8µµuÈ²½Âbµi½}bn²b²
ÂuÂµÂV½}b8½½b²ÂuÂµYÉi²µËFËYbËu}Â½Ë½µ
µ½8½Âµ8µ8È²½Âb¢Ð½}Âu}µÂO}O½²8µ½ÈbÈbÉµnOoYbOb8Y}Â-
ity are well established in everyday thought and talk, we risk prejudging 
their relationship if we automatically accept them. As Socrates taught us, 
there is, very often, no good reason to defer uncritically to people’s typically 
implicit, everyday grasp of complex concepts such as virtues.
,}b²b8½µ}nOoYbOb8Y}Â½Ë µFb½½b²ÂYb²µ½Y nÉb
distinguish between a person’s capacities (cognitive, physical, social) and 
their associated OoYbOb in them. Such a distinction will often be hard 
to draw, but it is genuine nonetheless for the reason that it is one thing for 
a person to possess certain capacities, but quite another for them to enjoy 
O²²bµYu OoYbOb  ½}b 8YV  n8O½V ½}b 8ub n 8 b²nbO½Ë
O88FbFÂ½µbÈb²bËÂOoYb½b²µµ}ÂYFbn88²½8ËbÉ½}8
YOÂnb8½}Ë ¢,}b²bbÈ8½n²µnOoYbObÉÈ8²ËFÂ½u}½
OÂYbOoYbOb½}8½bpossesses those capabilities, that they are stable 
and reliable, that one can access and control them as one desires, and so on. 
,}bµbn²µn½bbO½Â8OoYbObÉn½bFbO½8YµYnoOÂ½
to recognize but will, of course, become more visible when they are lost or 
8Ou·n²bÊ8bVn8b²µbËµ8}u}Ybu²bbnOoYbObbÊOb½
É}bOb²½8µ½Â8½µ²8uOb²½8b²µµiFbn²b8ÂFO8ÂY-
ence, say, or around bullying colleagues.
½bbO½Â8OoYbObµ½}b²bn²bObÊVO½ub½V8YÂ½8Ëb²bYV
but also essential to the proper recognition and exercise of one’s capaci-
½bµ¢,}bµOb8Yµ½²bu½}nb µ¯OoYbObµ}8bµ8b²µ µ¯µbµbn
the activities and projects they could plausibly undertake, the situations in 
and persons with whom they could live and work, and their wider sense of 
½}b²²µbO½µ8Y8F½µ¢YbbYV½}bO²ÂO8²bnOoYbObµbu8-
tively illustrated by the fact that an effective way to oppress other persons 
µ ½b²Yb½}b²OoYbObVn² µ½8ObVFËµÂFbO½u½}b½µ½²8½bubµ
nYb²u8½iµÂO}8µOb²ËV²YOÂbV8Y¬u8µu}½u¢­½µn²½}bµb
²b8µµ½}8½ÐY²8²b²u}½ËYbµO²FbµOoYbOb8µ¬8uYVÉ½}Â½
which there would not be any such thing as living a life” (quoted in Wil-
liams, 2006a, p. xviii-xix).
,}bO8½}8½OoYbObµ8uYµ²bqbO½bY½}b²bµ½ub½bËµ
among philosophers of education. The British philosopher of education, 
R. S. Peters, argued that through education a student ought to gradually 
¬b8² ½}b ²u}½ ½ OoYbOb  K½}b²L FbbnV­FË 8O§Â²u 8Y8µ½b²-
ing the “capacity to make a reasonable case” for what they believe (2009, 
¢Ï ¢,}b½b8O}b²µ}ÂYV8YYµ(b½b²µV nµ½b²½}b²µ½ÂYb½ µ¯¬OoYbOb
}µÉÉb²µV­½}b²bFËYbÈbu½}b¬µbnOoYbOb¢¢¢bObµµ8²Ë
n²Fbu8O}µb²­gV¢ÁÏ ¢nµVbYÂO8½8YOoYbObOb8²Ë
pull together, for it is precisely through educational practice and experience 
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that a student can develop the capacities, habits, and dispositions that are 
²b§Â²bYn²OoYb½½bbO½Â88O½È½Ëi½}µbnO8²bnÂËn²uVO²½-
cally evaluating, and reasonably expressing beliefs and convictions to other 
equally educated peers.
The double achievement of both a “capacity” and a “right” to belief 
8²µ8²½8½µ½bn²OoYbOb½}Â½Ë¢	b²8²Y38µYµ-
½uÂµ}bµ Fb½Ébb ½É ½Ëbµ n OoYbOb¢,}b o²µ½ µ ¬²b8µ8Fb O-
oYbObV­ u²ÂYbY  ²bqbO½ 8Y YbFb²8½V OÂYu ½bbO½Â8Ë
and ethically mature engagement with a community of peers. The second is 
½}b¬OoYbObnFu½²ËV­²½bY8µµÂ½VF8µV8Y²bÂYOb8Y
sustained by the derogation or exclusion of alternative perspectives (1995, 
¢ÁÏ¾ ¢Yb8ËVbYÂO8½µ}ÂYO}8bubFu½bYOoYbObFË8nn²Yu
acquaintance with facts, ideas, and degrees of knowledge and understanding 
½}8½bÊµb½}bFu½bY8½Â²bn½}8½OoYbOb¢38µ8½b²8YYµ½}8½½}b
n8O½½}8½²b8µ8FbOoYbObµ8O}bÈbY½}²Âu}bYÂO8½ÈbbYb8È²É½}
½}b²µV OÂYubb²µ8Y ½b8O}b²µV YO8½bµ ½}8½ OoYbOb µ¬8 µO8
µ½8½b¢¢¢²b8½bY½YµOÂµµV½}b²ÎuV8Y²bqbO½­ÁÏÏ¹FV¢¸Ï ¢

oYbOb bb²ubµ 8µ 8 ObÊË µO8 8Y ½bbO½Â8§Â8½Ë¢ ½ µ
cultivated and expressed through shared social practices in the context of 
8O½È½bµ8Y²bO½µ½}8½}8Èb8bµO88FË½bbO½Â8Ybµin²
example, arguing, believing, and convincing. This is why the dynamics of 
OoYbOb8nnbO½µ²nÂYË8b²µ µ¯O88O½Ë½8Èu8½b8YqÂ²µ}
É½} ½}bµO8É²YVbµbO8ËuÈb ½}8½ ½bbO½Â8OoYbObµ½²ÂO-
½Â²bµÂ²O88O½Ën²²8½88ubOË¢²bÈb²VµÂO}OoYbObO8Ob8²Ë
FbbÊObµµÈb²YboOb½ibO8Fb8²²u8½²bbi8Y½}bµbOµ½½Â½b
misestimates of a quality upon which personal agency and social life fun-
damentally depend. This being so, it is crucial that persons can manage or 
²buÂ8½b½}b²½bbO½Â8OoYbObV8Y½}µµÉ}b²bµbb8²bn²È²½Âbµ¢
There are doubtless many virtues that contribute to the regulation of intel-
bO½Â8OoYbObn²8½b8µ½½É²b8µµ¢,}bo²µ½µ½}8½½}bÈ²½Âbµ½bY
not to be rigidly sealed off from one another. At least within “real-world” 
practical and social contexts, the activity of one virtue will tend to call other 
virtues into play, for instance, if being just by standing up for an unfairly 
oppressed group demands courage. The second is that the regulation of 
½bbO½Â8 OoYbOb bObµµ8²Ë ÈÈbµ ½b²b²µ8 ½b²8O½µ 8Y
relationships, not least with peers and teachers, and this straightaway makes 
a role for virtues such as trust, respect, and empathy.
Still, the fact that many virtues play a role does not exclude the possibil-
ity that certain virtues play a special role, and I suggest that humility has 
8µbO8²b½}b88ubb½nOoYbOb¢b38²Y¢bµVµbb
8OµbObO½Fb½ÉbbOoYbOb8Y}Â½ËVFÂ½É}b²b}bµbbµ8
“intimate relation,” I see a deeper identity between them (2012, p. 698). 
A state of intellectual humility is identical to well-regulated or calibrated 
OoYbOb½}8½µ½bu²8½8F²8Yb²µ½²ÂO½Â²bn²buÂ8½Èb8O½È½bµ½}8½
µOµ½½Â½Èbn8uY8YqÂ²µ}unb¢
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OµbËV½}bV}Â½Ëµ8È²½Âbn²½}b88ubb½nOoYbOb¢
Although there are many possible ways to cash out that claim, let me focus 
ÂÉ}8½½8b½Fb½}bµ½²½8½¢,}µµ½}bYb8½}8½OoYbOb
has levels at which it operates and that intellectual humility requires a spe-
O8µbµ½È½Ë½½}bµbbÈbµ¢,}bo²µ½bÈbµ8ub½8OoYbOb: the con-
oYbOb8b²µÈbµ½µ½}b²Ou½ÈbO88O½bµ8YbÊb²bObµVµµ
and training, and perhaps their general “self-trust” in their status and ability 
as an intellectual agent, able to pursue and attain truths about the world, 
say (cf. Zagzebski, 2012). But agents, of course, do not act alone; they must 
typically engage with and rely upon others, and this points to the next level.
The second level is ObO½ÈbOoYbObU½}bOoYbObÈbµ½bY½}-
ers, including peers, teachers, and the social communities with which one 
bu8ubµ¢,}bµbu}½Fbn8²Ë n²8µ½8bÂµObO½Èbµib²}8µ
the delegates to a conference or more formalized institutional or profes-
sional collectives, such as the faculty of an academic department or the 
OÂ½Ën}µ}b²µnµObOb¢
bO½ÈbOoYbObu}½½8b½}b
n²n8OoYbOb½}bOb½bOb8YuYÉnOb8uÂbµV²
the integrity of one’s institution, or in the civility, fair-mindedness, or profes-
sionalism of one’s fellow inquirers. But both agents and collectives must also 
µ}8²b8nÂ²½}b²VYbbb²OoYbObV8Y½}µ½µ½½}b½}²Y8Yo8bÈb¢
This is the level of Ybb OoYbObU ½}b OoYbOb Èbµ½bY bÊO½ËV
or perhaps more typically implicitly, in the deeper social, intellectual, and 
historical foundations upon which individual and collective activities and 
²bO½µ²bµ½¢+ÂO}YbbOoYbObu}½½8b½}bn²n8²FÂµ½µbµbn
possibility of making intellectual progress within a given agenda of inquiry, 
²8YbbOoYbOb½}bnÂY8b½8µÂF½ËnbÈb½}bµ½YnoOÂ½
²Fbµ½}8½b½}b8½}n§Â²Ë¢Ð½b²8½ÈbËVYbbOoYbObOÂY
be invested in the richness of the intellectual heritage that shapes the agenda 
n §Â²Ë 8Y µbOobµ ²bbÈ8½ ²FbµinO}8b 8bµ}½½ µ¯ n8½}
¬µ½8Y8²YµnÉ²½}­qÉun²½}b¬}b²½8Obn}Â88O}bÈb-
b½­nÉ}O}½}b½b8O}b²µ½}b¬ÈuOÂµ½Y8­ÁÏÏsV¢¾¸ ¢

b8²ËVYbbOoYbObO8FbÈbµ½bY8ËYnnb²b½½}uµiY µ¯
²Y8bY ²Yb²V µOb½oO ²b8µV +²½ µ¯ ²8½8 ²u²bµµi8Y }bµ ½
“ground” the intellectual and cultural activities of a given culture. Many 
decisive episodes in the history of philosophy could, perhaps, be interpreted 
½b²µn²8YO8µ}n½µVFËµµ²FËu8Vn8OÂ½Â²b µ¯YbbOoYbOb¢
The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, for instance, has characterized 
½}bbb²ubObnYb²YO½²bµnµbOÂ8²}Â8µ8µ8µµnOo-
YbOb¬Y µ¯µ8Èu8O½V­OÂbYÉ½}8bÉnÂYYbbOoYbOb
in human “powers of moral ordering,” partly through ambitious projects of 
bYÂO8½Èb8YµO8²bn²ÁÏÏ¸V¢Á¸Vg¾VÁ ¢
,}bµb ½}²bb bÈbµn ½bbO½Â8OoYbOb8²bb½}b² µ}8²ËYb8²-
cated from one another nor rigidly stable. Indeed, these levels interact and 
O}8ubVbµbO8ËµOb8µµ²u8nOoYbOb8½bbÈbO8}8Èb
effects upon the others. If a male philosopher becomes cognizant of the 
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}bbn O½ ubYb² F8µV ½}b }µ OoYbObu}½ Fb bu8-
½ÈbË 8nnbO½bYin² µ½8ObV FË ²bOuÎu ½}b Â½b8F½Ë n }µ ²²
OoYbOb½}b8²½8½Ë8YubYb²bÂ½²8½Ën}µbnV}µbb²µ8Y
Ob8uÂbµV8Y½}b}µ}O8½²8Y½µbbVb¢u¢Vbµ8YÂ½O}µV
ÁÏÁV8Y+8ÂVÁÏ¾ ¢½µ8µ½²Âb½}8½OoYbObO8Fb²bµ½²bYVbÈb
if the loss is likely to be quicker than the restoration, and even though the 
²bµ½²bYOoYbObÉbËFb²bn²8ub¢
,}b O½ubOË 8Y n²8u½Ë n OoYbOb µ 8 ²½8½ 8µbO½ n
}Â½Ë¢½bÊ8µÉ}Ë88uuOoYbObµYnoOÂ½V²½8½V8YV
hence, why there is real work for the virtue of humility to do. An intel-
lectually humble person is alert to the contingency and fragility of their 
OoYbOb8Yµ8OÉbYubµ½}bbbYn²½µ8O½Èb88ubb½²²buÂ-
lation. A main way to do this is to develop and employ robust practices of 
OoYbObO8F²8½. By that term, I refer to cognitive and social prac-
½ObµÉ}µbÂ²µb µ ½u8Âub8ub½8V ObO½ÈbV8YYbbOoYbObV
and these can take many different forms: for instance, basic fact-checking, 
debate and argumentation, psychological studies, historical inquiry, and, of 
course, philosophical practice.
In each case, and in different ways, a person is identifying and testing 
the grounds n²½}b²OoYbOb· YbbYVb½ËuO8ËV ½}b²un½}b
½b²n²¬}Â½Ë­²bbV8½V8Y+8µ²½µ½}b½b²n²¬b8²½}­²
“ground,” and the history of Western epistemology evinces a series of meta-
phors of “grounds” and “foundations” for belief or certainty. Moreover, 
²bÈ8b½²}b½²Oµn}Â½Ën½b8Ë½}µ8µµO8½i8µÉb½8n
“getting a good grounding” in a new subject, for instance.
+ÂO}²8O½Obµ n OoYbObO8F²8½ O8 ½8b8Ë n²µ 8Y 8²b
highly shaped by professional and social context. I might seek formal and 
µËµ½b8½OO8F²8½nËOoYbObFËµÂF½½uÂFO8½µn²bb²
review or by seeking structured academic training with a supportive super-
Èµ²¢ ²u}½µbb²bn²8µ½8bÂµO8F²8½Vb²}8µFË
asking for feedback after giving a talk or by running my ideas past the 
barista who makes me coffee every day. Many of the norms and practices 
of the social culture of modern academia can be interpreted in terms of 
²8O½Obµ n² OoYbObO8F²8½in²8 ² n²8V µ½8bÂµ ²
µËµ½b8½Oi8Y ½}bË 8 ²bqbO½ ½}b n8O½ ½}8½V YÈYÂ8ËV }Â8 Fbuµ
tend to be rather poor at intellectual self-improvement, such that externally 
structured intersubjective practices of correction are our best prospects (see, 
e.g., Ahlstrom-Vij, 2013).
To conclude this section, our intellectual activities, and therefore our 
social lives, depend crucially upon our being able to exercise our intellec-
tual capacities, and this in turn requires that we can invest them with the 
8²²8½b Ybu²bbµ n OoYbOb¢ -n²½Â8½bËV OoYbOb µ ObÊV
contingent, and highly shaped by situational and intersubjective factors, 
and it operates at the psychological, social, historical, and even metaphysi-
O8 bÈbµ¢  ½} ½}8½ }Â½Ë O8 FbuÉ½} ½É µu}½µU ,}b o²µ½ µ
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½}bObÊVOY½8V8YO½ub½µ½8½ÂµnÂ²OoYbObV8Y½}b
second is the need to embrace attitudes and practices that enable its man-
8ubb½¢,}bµb µu}½µ 8µ ½ ½ ½}b ½²Â½} ÂYÉu3½½ubµ½b µ¯
curt warning that it is “terribly hard work” for a person to try seriously to 
“dismantle . . . the bYoObnK½}b²L²Yb­gÏV¢Á¹ ¢
In the following two sections, I further develop these remarks by offering 
a more systematic account of the virtue of intellectual humility.
3. CONFIDENCE CONDITIONS
The virtue of humility consists of two pairs of components. First, the hum-
Fbb²µµYµµbY½²bOuÎb½}b²bbÈ8½OoYbObOY½µn²
8uÈb8µµb²½VFbbnV²OÈO½V8Y½}bbÊ½b½n ½}b² nÂob½
of them. Second, they then act on this recognition by using it to regulate 
their intellectual conduct accordingly. In this section, I focus upon the 
“recognition-disposition” and the idea of OoYbOb OY½µ. Impor-
tantly, these two dispositions only optimally function through mutual inter-
action, and genuine humility, therefore, requires them both.
The starting point for this disposition is the idea that assertions, beliefs, 
and convictions always depend upon certain conditions that ought to be ful-
obYn8uÈb8ub½O8bu½8½bË8µµb²½VFbbÈbV²8O½É½}OoYbOb¢
The conditions underlying a given intellectual act will often be fairly obvious, 
because an assertion or belief will typically be about8uÈb½OiµÂO}8µ
b²²Y8²Â½²Ën8²u²½²ÂµO8½½b²Ëi8Yµ½ÂµOb²½8
Y²bO½µ¢-n²½Â8½bËV½}b²b8²b8Ë½}b²O8µbµÉ}b²b½}bÂYb²Ëu
OY½µ 8²b²b YnoOÂ½ ½ Yb½nËV 8Y ½}µ µ 8½}b² ²b8µÉ}Ë
humility often requires real cognitive work.
,}b²b 8²b ½}²bb F²8Y ½Ëbµ n OoYbOb OY½µ ½}8½ 8²8b ½}b
bÈbµnOoYbObYb½obY½}b8µ½µbO½¢,}bo²µ½8²bagential condi
tionsU,}bµb²bqbO½½}bn8O½½}8½Â²½bbO½Â8O88O½bµ8²bOY½bY
FË}ËµO8VOu½ÈbV8YbÊb²b½8n8O½²µiµbµ²Ën8OÂ½bµVOu½Èb
8F½bµVo²µ½}8YbÊb²bObµV²8O½O88Y²nbµµ8½²8uV8Yµ
¢Ð8ub½u}½Âµ½nË½}b²OoYbObFË½uÂ½É}8½½}bËÉ
or have experienced, which explains why a standard response to a person 
É}8bµÉY²ÂÂµÂ8O8µµ½§Âb²Ë½}b²u²ÂYµn²OoYbObi
¬3}8½8bµ ËÂ ½} ½}8½¨­ ¬8Èb ËÂ bÈb Fbb ½}b²b¨­i8Y 8µ
why formalized systems of accreditation, such as CVs, are so useful.
The second are collective conditionsU½}bOoYbObµ½}8½8²bÂµ½obYFË
appeal to the collectives with whom we live, work, and think. I might be 
OoYb½ËO8µ8FÂ½½}bÈ²½Âbn}Â½ËFbO8Âµb½²Âµ½ËO-
structively critical peers and can draw upon the richness and support of the 
OÂ½ËnÈ²½Âbbµ½buµ½µ¢Ð8ub½O8Âµ½nË½}b²OoYbOb
ObO½ÈbËFËYbF8½uÉ½}Ob8uÂbµV²bµb½uÉ²½bb²µV8YoY-
ubOÂ²8ubb½8YY²bO½n²nbÉ§Â²b²µi8YV8u8VÉb½bµ½
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Â²ÂYub½µnbb µ¯OoYbObFË8µun ½}bËÉ½}µb²µV
have read that book, or have worked with this group, and so on.
,}b½}²Y8Yo8½Ëbµ8²bYbbOoYbObOY½µ¢,}bµµF½Ë
and intelligibility of our intellectual activities and ambitions inevitably relies 
upon certain background conditions. Many theorists have explored differ-
b½µµFbFbO½µnYbbOoYbObi¬8²8YuµV­Lebenswelt, projects 
n §Â²Ëi8Y ½}b² }µ½²O8V ½²8µObYb½8V 8Y }bbuO8
µ½²ÂO½Â²bµ¢+ÂO}OY½µu²ÂYYbbOoYbObVn²µ½8ObV½}bµ-
sibility of rational inquiry into the nature of reality, and often a community 
u}½ËFbOb8É8²bn½}bµbYbbOY½µÉ}b½µOoYbObµ
µ}8b² µ½¢ 8bµ}½½V n² µ½8ObV nÂY  ½}b8Ë¬ÈObµ­½}8½
8YbÂ½}b¬OÈb²µ8½n}Â8Y­8F8µµn²YbbOoYbOb
the rationality and conviviality of our species (2004, ch. 8). But perhaps he 
ÉÂY}8Èbµ½µbn½}8½OoYbOb}8Y}b²bOuÎbY½}8½½}b²8ubn
those voices was less plural, and more parochial, than he appreciated.
Ð ½bbO½Â8Ë }ÂFb b²µ µ YµµbY ½ ²bOuÎb ½}b Oo-
dence conditions that underlie assertions, beliefs, and convictions, whether 
their own or those of others. In this chapter, though, I focus only upon 
¬µbnY²bO½bY­}Â½Ë¢+ÂO}²bOu½}8µ½É8µbO½µU½}bo²µ½µ²bO-
ognition of the conditions that are relevant to a given assertion (and so 
 V8Y½}bµbOYµ²bOu½n½}bbÊ½b½½É}O}½}bËnÂo½}µb
OY½µ¢ bu}½µ8Ë½}b}ÂFb²bOuÎbÉ}8½OY½µ½}bËbbY
½nÂo8YÉ}b½}b²½}bËY²OÂYnÂo½}bV8YVnOÂ²µbVµÂO}²bO-
ognition ought to be consistently applied and reliably achieved. It is an act 
of humility to recognize such underlying conditions and the extent, if any, 
½É}O}bnÂoµ½}b¢½µ8½½}µ½½}8½½}b²È²½ÂbµÉÂY8Ë8
cooperative role in enabling humility. For instance, it surely takes courage, 
discipline, and trust to engage in the self-directed critical practice that Witt-
ubµ½bO8bY¬Yµ8½u½}bbYoObn²Yb¢­
½bbO½Â8}Â½ËµOb8²Ë8YnoOÂ½È²½Âb½}8½Yb8Yµ²b8Ou-
tive work. The humble person has to be alert to their assertions, beliefs, 
8YOÈO½µV½Yb½nË8Y½²8O½}bO}8uuOoYbObOY½µ
that underlie them, and to do all of this alongside their everyday cogni-
tive work. Certainly humility cannot take the form of one-off episodic 
intellectual housekeeping, even if it will periodically require fairly robust 
self-appraisal of a sort common in Western antiquity and then revived dur-
ing the early modern period in the form of “meditations,” “regimens of 
the mind,” and other signs of a “shift toward . . . intellectual virtue” in the 
context of “distempers of the whole mind and . . . cultivating regimens” 

²b8ÂVÁÏV¢sV¸ ¢Ðbµµb½8Ob½n½}bµb8O½Èb²8O½Obµ
nOoYbObO8F²8½ÉFbeducation.
+bOoO8ËVµÂuubµ½½}8½½}b²b8²b½}²bbÉ8Ëµ½}8½bYÂO8½O8O-
½²FÂ½b½½}bOÂ½È8½n8O88O½Ë½²bOuÎbOoYbObOY½µ¢
First, education can inform8b²µ8FÂ½½}bn8O½8YObÊ½ËnOo-
dence conditions, most obviously by providing information about the range 
of things about which one could offer assertions and form beliefs. A student 
6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd   60 19-10-2015   15:15:37
Educating for Intellectual Humility 61
must have an initial sense of the possible objects of assertion, belief, and 
OÈO½nµ}bµ½bF8²Â½}b½8µnYb½nËu½}bOoYbOb
conditions that underlie them. Second, education can inspire a respect for 
OoYbObOY½µ8Y½}bbbY½nÂo½}bµ½}8½½}bËOb½µbb
½}b½²Â½}(b½b²µ µ¯O8n²½}b½¬b8²½}b²u}½­½OoYb½Fbbn8Y
38µ µ¯Yµ½O½Fb½Ébb²b8µ8FbOoYbOb8Y½}bOoYbObn
bigotry. A student might gradually come to feel delight at providing grounds 
n²}b²8µµb²½µ8YFbbnµ8YoY½}8½µ}b½b²YO½µ}b²bb²µÉ}8b
OoYb½8µµb²½µÉ½}Â½nÂou½}bbObµµ8²ËOY½µ¢ÐY½}²YV
bYÂO8½O8YÂO½8µ½ÂYb½½²8O½ObµnOoYbObO8F²8½in
8²uÂuVYbF8½uV8Yµi8YVn8O½V8Ën88²bYÂO8½8²8O-
tices already have this purpose (such as dialectical exchange, receiving and 
responding to feedback, and so on).
Education can contribute to the cultivation of intellectual humility by 
informing, inspiring, and inducting students into the dispositions and capac-
½bµ½}8½8²b²b§Â²bYn½}bË8²b½²bOuÎb½}b²bbÈ8Ob8YnÂob½n
½}bOoYbObOY½µ½}8½ÂYb²b½}b²8µµb²½µVFbbnµV8YOÈO-
tions. Such educative experiences will also hopefully cultivate other virtues, 
OÂYu½}bbµ½}8½²buÂ8½b½b²b²µ8bÊO}8ubµiµÂO}8µ½²Âµ½8Y
bYbYbµµibµbO8Ë uÈb ½}8½ b8²u ½ ²bOuÎb OoYbOb
conditions requires sustained engagement with peers who are almost certain 
½nnb²O}8bubµ½V8YO²½OµµnVÂ²OoYbOb¢
Though the recognition-disposition is necessary to humility, it is, by 
½µbnVµÂnoOb½n²8nÂ8OOÂ½n½}8½È²½Âbn²½}b²b8µ½}8½½Ybµ
not distinguish humility from several of its associated vices. A person might, 
n²µ½8ObVFbb²nbO½ËuY8½²bOuÎuOoYbObOY½µ8Y½}b
bÊ½b½½É}O}½}bËnÂo½}bVFÂ½8µ²b8FËn8½8O½Â8Ë8O½½}b
basis of that recognition. For instance, an arrogant person could plausibly 
FbYbµO²FbY8µ µbbÉ}²bOuÎbµ ½}8½ ½}bËY½ nÂo ½}bO-
oYbObOY½µ n²8 Ob²½8 O8VFÂ½ u²bµ ½}µ8Y8bµ µ½²u
8µµb²½µ8ËÉ8Ëibu}½ µ8ËV ½}bËÉFb½½b²VFÂ½Y¯½8O½ ½¢
Â½ËµV½}b²bn²bV½8²²ÉËOµ½²ÂbYn ½ µOobY½½}b²bO-
u½n½}bnÂob½n²bbÈ8½OoYbObOY½µiÉ}8½µ8µ
needed is a further disposition to act upon that recognition by using it to 
guide or direct how one conducts oneself intellectually.
In the next section, I explain the second pair of components that make up 
the virtue of humility: the disposition to regulate one’s intellectual conduct.
4. INTELLECTUAL CONDUCT
I take the idea of intellectual conduct to be crucial to our understanding of 
intellectual virtue and especially of its relation to education. By that term, 
I refer to a person’s manner of conducting, directing, and managing their 
intellectual activities, including how they form beliefs, articulate claims, 
and especially how they engage with other persons, ideas, and traditions. 
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Intellectual conduct includes a range of affective, behavioral, and cognitive 
dispositions and manifests in posture, tone, and bodily and verbal language 
and might also be understood in terms of style or demeanor. The way in 
which a person conducts themselves intellectually will be expressed in how 
they phrase their claims, voice their concerns, state their worries, present 
their criticisms, hold to their convictions in the face of challenge, and so on.
 bu}½bu½8½bË8µ}É½bbO½Â8OYÂO½µYµ½uÂµ}bYn²
µO8OYÂO½VuÈb½}b²FÈÂµ²Ê½Ë½b8½}b²in}ÉVn²
µ½8ObVbu}½Yµ½uÂµ}É}8½ObO8bY¬OYÂO½n½}bÂYb²-
standing” from a broader sense of personal and social conduct. The answer 
is that the expectation of a sharp distinction between intellectual and social 
conduct ought to be rejected, given the centrality of our intellectual activi-
ties and commitments in our practical and social activities and engagements. 
A main reason why ethics and epistemology are so deeply interpenetrated 
is that everything we do in the social world involves epistemic concepts and 
OOb²µiÉbYubV YÂF½V Ob²½8½ËV 8Y µ i8 n8O½ ²bOuÎbY FË
the Pyrrhonian and early modern skeptics. My sympathies clearly lie with 
“regulative” or “responsibilist” conceptions of the nature of epistemology 
and of its relation to ethics (cf. Kidd, 2012).
Central to my general view of the virtuous inquirer is that they are 
disposed to regulate their intellectual conduct, and this is something that 
I suspect is therefore a component of all of the intellectual virtues. Each intel-
bO½Â8È²½Âb}8µ½µµ}8²bY8YµbOoOnÂO½µVÉ}O}O8Fb¬8bY­
in various ways, but each is a component of the more general regulative 
activity of aspiring to, if not achieving, good intellectual conduct, intellec-
tual virtuousness, or whatever one wishes to call it (see, e.g., Roberts and 
3YÁÏÏ¸V8²½ ¢
Clearly there are many different forms of intellectual conduct, and per-
ceptions and preferences vary between individuals and across history and 
culture. Many classic texts in the history of philosophy could be read as 
YbµO²½µnYnnb²b½n²µn ½bbO½Â8OYÂO½in½}bÈ²½Âbµ8Y
conduct that characterize the Stoic sage, a Confucian “consummate per-
son,” and other exemplars of virtue. A very rich example is the Analects 
n
nÂOÂµi8bY½bYObO½nµ8ËuµVFµb²È8½µV8YbµYbµV
²8½}b² ½}88FÉ²½½bFË ½}b8µ½b²iÉ}O}nnb² ²O}YbµO²½µ
of the attitudes, speech, and behavior of the virtuous aspirant (see, e.g., 
 Fb²YuVÁÏ ¢
b½²88u½}bµbÈ²½ÂbµµÉ}8½}8ÈbO8bY½b-
lectual humility: to have an active awareness of “abilities that one does not 
possess,” to “love” and “stand in awe” of the “teachings of the sages” and 
¬8½§Â½ËV­8Y½8É8Ëµ¬oY8½b8O}b²K8YLbÂ8½b½}b­µ}ÂFb
²bOu½nObO½Èb8YYbbOoYbObÁÏÏ¾V¶¶gpV¸¢ÁÏV¹¢gV¸¢ÁÁ·
On¢*Âµ}uVÁÏ¾ ¢+ÂO}½bÊ½µYbµO²Fb½}bb²µÉ}µÉbOYÂO½bYi
b½}O8ËVµO8ËV½bbO½Â8Ëi8YÉ}bÊbobµ8È²½ÂÂµnb¢
² ²bµb½ Â²µbµV  nOÂµ Ë Â ½}b µbOoO 8µbO½µ n uY
OYÂO½ ½}8½ ²bqbO½ ½bbO½Â8 }Â½ËV ½}b O²b nÉ}O} µ ²bqbO½ÈbË
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²bµYu ½ ½}b² O}8uu nÂob½n ½}b OoYbOb OY½µ ²b-
evant to their assertions, beliefs, and convictions. A crucial difference 
between the humble person and their arrogant or meek peers is that they 
O8bnnbO½ÈbË²buÂ8½b½}b²OYÂO½8YVµV8ÈY½}bbÊObµµÈbOoYbOb
n½}b8²²u8½8Y½}bYboOb½OoYbObn½}bbb¢,Fb½bbO½Â-
8ËÉbOYÂO½bYµV½}b²bn²bV8²½½}8ÈbÉb88ubYOoYbObV
and this is the particular contribution of the virtue of intellectual humil-
½ËV8uµYb½}b²È²½Âbµ²bbÈ8½½OoYbObO8F²8½8Y½½}b²
aspects of intellectual life.
Such conduct-regulation can take three related forms, distinguished by 
½}b8µbO½nÂ² ½bbO½Â8 OYÂO½ ½}8½ µFbu ²buÂ8½bY¢,}bo²µ½ µ
8²8µ8²buÂ8½UµbOoO8ËV88ub½ µ¯µbn8²8µ8n½}bµOb8Y
strength of their intellectual capacities, and it will most obliviously take the 
n²n ÂYOÂµÂ²YÉu²8Yun ½}b² OoYbOb¢,}b µbOY µ
8½½½ÂYb²buÂ8½: Much of our intellectual life is structured by attitudes, 
either positively or negatively valenced, toward a range of objects, includ-
ing other agents and certain collectives, but also ideas, styles of argument, 
types of evidence, whole disciplines, entire intellectual traditions, and so on. 
Such attitudes ought to be regulated, because they constitute our preemp-
½Èb8Yn½bÂ²bqbO½Èbµbµbn½}bµ8Obn½bbO½Â8µµF½bµi½}b
structures of intelligibility, salience, and cogency that shape our intellectual 
life, including what one welcomes or resists, derogates or demeans, praises 
²²½bµV8Yµ¢+ÂO}8½½½ÂYbµ8²bn½bbÊO½Ëµ½8½bYi8Yµ½-
uÂµ}bYÐb²O8}µ}b²Ob}8Y8µ½b²²b8YuV¬Âµ½µ8Ë ½
½}b}µ½²Ën}µ}Ë­i²½}bËu}½FbO½ Ob²½8²b8²µV
jokes, or facial expressions. The regulation of agential and collective intel-
lectual attitudes is an essential aspect of good intellectual conduct, especially 
because our capacity to cultivate certain virtues is crucially premised upon 
our engaging with persons, ideas, and approaches very different from our 
own. It is, after all, a poor sort of tolerance that only speaks to its friends.
The third form of conduct-regulation is 8F½²buÂ8½. Typically, 
individuals will organize and direct their inquiries according to a certain 
µb½ n 8F½µi½É²½b ½}b Ybo½Èbu²8} 8 8²½OÂ8² b²-
son, say, or to restore the reputation of a neglected thinker. Many features 
of modern academic training can be understood as formalized structures 
for ambition-regulation, including doctoral supervision that ought to guide 
8 µ½ÂYb½ ½}²Âu} ½}b²Obµµbµn Yb½nËuV ²bµb8²O}uVYbouV 8Y
completing a focused and achievable project of work. Ambition-regulation 
can take different forms. It might involve adjusting an ambition, perhaps 
by focusing upon a single text by an author rather than an entire corpus, or 
alternatively abandoning an ambition newly recognized to be beyond one’s 
8F½bµV²o8Ë½OÂYÈÈbadoptingbÉ8F½µin²µ½8ObV
nb²b8ÎbµV½b µ¯µÂ²²µb8YYbu}½V½}8½bn8O½nÂoµ½}b²b-
bÈ8½OoYbObOY½µ½8n8²}u}b²Ybu²bb½}8bµÂµbO½bY¢,}b
fact that a person could adopt a particular ambition does not automatically 
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entail that they should therefore adopt it, because the choice of which ambi-
½µ½Â²µÂbµ8nnbO½bYFË8²8ubn½}b²OµYb²8½µi½}b}ÂFb
person, therefore, has an acute sense of the ambitions that are legitimately 
8È88Fb½½}buÈb½}bOoYbObOY½µ½}bËnÂo¢ÐO½µn}Â-
ity might involve adjusting, abandoning, or adopting ambitions and are not 
OobY½8F8Yu²Éb8bu8F½µi½}8½µ8bu8½Èbµbµbn
}Â½Ë½}8½É8½½²bµµ½¢Â½ËO8V8½b8µ½ËÈbÉVamplify, as 
well as attenuate, one’s ambitions. Although this may seem counterintuitive, 
½}b²bµi½²bb8½8b8²b²½iuY²b8µ½Ybnb²ÂO²½O8Ë½
everyday usage, especially if good reasons are given for doing so.
These three forms of conduct-regulation should be understood as inte-
u²8½bY8µbO½µn8 µubuF8 ²buÂ8½ÈbbYb8È²i½}8½nconducting 
oneself well intellectually—rather than as isolated aspects of a more diffuse 
activity. Many virtues are required for the attainment of good conduct, of 
course, but, to repeat another caveat, I am focusing upon humility. Indeed, 
since a person’s appraisal, attitudes, and ambitions are united in her intel-
lectual life, one should expect such “integration,” especially given that, for 
instance, a change in one’s self-appraisal will typically affect one’s attitudes 
toward others and one’s ambitions. A person who suddenly enjoys a new-
nÂYµbµbn8ub½8OoYbObu}½FbOb²b8µµb²½Èb8²ÂY½}-
b²µ8Y½8b8bÉËbÊ8YbYµb½nFY8F½µi½}Âu}VnOÂ²µbV
they ought to take care not to lapse into arrogance or dogmatism.
The intellectually well-conducted person should therefore evince a cer-
tain integrity, unity, and perhaps beauty. Consider Wittgenstein’s unchar-
acteristically warm praise of Søren Kierkegaard as a “profound thinker,” 
and, in fact, “a saint.” Although the meaning of this remark is unclear, it 
8ÂµFË²bqbO½µ3½½ubµ½b µ¯OÈO½½}8½8¬²nÂY½}b²­µ½
µË8b²µÉ½}²nÂY½}Âu}½µin²8ËÉObYYbÈOÂY}8Èb
½}µbiFÂ½V²8½}b²V½}8½8²nÂY½}b²µ8b²µÉ}µbnb¬bÊ²bµµbµ­
²µ¬bFb8½On¢¢¢½}bµb½}Âu}½µ­+O}F8ÂµnbYVÁÏÏ¸V¢gn ¢
To succeed in making one’s life an “emblem” of one’s thoughts through 
YµObY OYÂO½ ²b§Â²bµ 8Y bÊ²bµµbµ È²½ÂbµiO8²bnÂbµµV µ8ËV ²
½²Â½}nÂbµµi8YµO8FbFb8Â½nÂn²½}8½²b8µOn¢
b²VÁÏÏg8 ¢
Such beautiful conduct might be grounded in the aspiration to good con-
duct as well as the achievement of it, especially since accepting that one 
still falls short, while still striving, can express humility, tenacity, and other 
virtues. So whether by aspiration or achievement, a well-conducted person 
approves of Pascal’s self-directed advice to “seek my . . . dignity” in the 
“ordering of my thought,” and live according to the principle that “to think 
Éb¢¢¢µ½}bF8µO²Obn²8½Ë­gÏV¶¶¾VÁÏ ¢
Y ½bbO½Â8 OYÂO½ µ Fbµ½ Âµ½²8½bY ²8O½O8Ë FË 8b8 ½
bÊb8²µiµÂO}8µµ8ubµV½b8O}b²µV²bu}½bbYb²µµOn¢78uÎbFµV
2010). An exemplar might be an especially inspiring spiritual leader or a 
great intellectual hero from history whom one admires and wishes to emu-
8½b¢+ÂO}ouÂ²bµO8FbbÊb8²µF½}n½}battainment of good conduct 
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or, more modestly, of the aspiration to be well-conducted, and so, in this 
8½½b²µbµbV8bÊb8²bbY½Fb8¬µ8½Ë­ouÂ²bµÂO}8µb²bu88²Y
evidently was for Wittgenstein.
½8ËV½}Âu}V½}bµbbÊb8²µu}½OÂYbb µ¯½b8O}b²µib²}8µ
8Éµb½Â½²²8O}8²µ8½O bO½Â²b²¢Ob8YÈµbY½}8½½Â½²µÂu}½½
“fashion the Carriage” and “form the Mind” of their pupils by exemplify-
u¬uY8F½µ8Y(²Obµn2b²½Âb­½}8½u²8YÂ8ËYÂOb½}b
¬8Èb8Y½8½nÉ}8½ µÊObb½­¹V¶s ¢+ÂO}bÊb8²Ë
instruction requires a sustained and attentive personal and pedagogic rela-
tionship, structured by an at least implicit appreciation of the exemplary 
nature of the teaching and within which exemplary conduct can be demon-
strated by the tutor and discerned by the pupil (see, e.g., Yolton, 1998, and 
Wanderer, 2013).
Education can contribute to the cultivation of good intellectual conduct 
µbÈb²8É8ËµVFÂ½ÉYµOÂµµÂµ½½}²bb¢,}bo²µ½µ½}8½bYÂO8½O8
inform students about good and bad forms of intellectual conduct, explain-
ing what it is, what makes it so, and so on. A tutor might, for instance, cor-
rect the aggressive attitudes of a tutee, or a doctoral supervisor might seek to 
soften a supervisee’s tendency to be uncharitable toward their “rivals.” The 
second is to inspire students to pursue and take pleasure in good intellectual 
conduct, evident in Confucius’s efforts to teach students to appreciate the 
“harmonious ease” of good conduct as “beautiful,” and so something to 
Èb8YbÂ8½bÁÏÏ¾V¶¢Á ¢,}µO8Fb8µb8µË8µ²8µu8µ½ÂYb½n²
their fair-mindedness or humility, or, of course, rebuking them for arrogance 
or unfairness.
The third way is that education can induct students into robust practices 
for the regulation of their appraisal, attitudes, and ambitions, for instance 
FËnnb²u½}bÉ}8½}bÉbËO8bY8¬bÈb²bYu8Ë­n¬O-
scious correction and instruction” within physical and social environments 
suitably “framed” for the shaping of “mental and moral disposition” (2012, 
¢¸V ¢
The process of education can, therefore, afford structured opportuni-
ties for the cultivation and exercise of a student’s disposition to regulate 
½}b²½bbO½Â8OYÂO½inÉ}8½½µVÉ}Ë½µuYV8YÉ}Ë½Âu}½
½Fb ÈbYiFËF½}½}b²b½O8 µ½²ÂO½8Y²8O½O8Ybµ½²8½¢
Such good conduct requires many dispositions and capacities, of course, 
OÂYu8O88O½Ë½²bOuÎb½}b²bbÈ8Ob8YnÂob½nOoYbOb
OY½µin²O8½²b²Ë²buÂ8½bËOYÂO½nO8½u8ÂubË
OoYbObV½b8µ½FbO8ÂµbV½}8½O8µbV8u²8½8FÂ½n8O½µ8FÂ½
my capacities and character that are essential to good conduct.
 Èb² ½}b 8µ½ nbÉ µbO½µV  }8Èb nnb²bY 8 8OOÂ½ n ½}b È²½Âb n
intellectual humility and indicated how it can be cultivated through educa-
tion. My aim was not to offer a systematic account, but rather to secure 
½}bO8½}8½½µ8È²½Âb¢+½V½ÉFbÂµbnÂ½F²bqËOµYb²µb
²bYO½8Fb FbO½µin² }Â½ËV qua virtue, has a bad reputation 
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among philosophers. Typically, the objections are, in quick succession, that 
humility requires ignorance of one’s abilities and achievements, encour-
ages a self-abnegating stance of imposed servility, and requires paradoxical 
µbn8½½²FÂ½½bµbnn8§Â8½ËYbobY½b²µn½}bYµ8²F8½
nb²µ8²8µb²b²½ µbbV b¢u¢V²Èb²V gV 8Y²bFb²uVÁÏÏpV
part 1). Such objections are typically directed at the particular conceptions 
n}Â½Ë½}8½qÉbYn²½}b
}²µ½8½²8Y½½}b3bµ½V²8½}b²½}8
to humility tout court. Further east, especially in Confucian philosophy, 
there are alternative conceptions of humility that are less vulnerable to this 
set of objections, thereby softening their force (see, e.g., Pardue, 2013, and 
Rushing, 2013).
More generally, it should be clear that the intellectually humble per-
µ}8ÈbYbµO²FbY µYbobY²bOµbË  ½b²µn ½}b²ÉbYub8Y
ÂYb²µ½8Yuin²µ½8ObVn8²8ubnOoYbObOY½µi8Y½}b²
having an active and acute sense of the scope and strength of their intellec-
½Â8O88O½bµ¢Â½ËV½}bV²b§Â²bµb½}b²u²8Ob²µbn8F8µbb½
and there is no obvious paradox in the claim that a person can cultivate a 
capacity to identify facts about themselves through personal and collective 
effort. Indeed, that is surely a primary purpose of education, a fact recog-
ÎbYFËObV(b½b²µV 8bµ}½½V8Y½}b²µ¢
There are, however, a set of more imposing obstacles to humility in the 
O½bÊ½nbYÂO8½V8Y½}bË8²b½}b½On½}bo8µbO½¢
5. EDUCATION, CORRUPTION, AND EDIFICATION

²½O8²bqbO½½}bµ½8½bn²bÈ8u²88YµO8OÂ½Â²bµ8
integral feature of the philosophical enterprise, evident in the earliest and 
u²b8½bµ½ ouÂ²bµ n ½}b²bb 8Y
}bµb ½²8Y½µV OÂYu +O²8½bµ µ¯
castigation of the Sophists and Confucius’s calls for revival of the “rites.” 
Such critiques typically included commentary on contemporary educational 
practices and conceptions coupled to proposals for the establishment of 
YbYO8½bY µO}µ 8Y bYÂO8½Èb OÂ½bµ¢ ,}b 8²Yb n OÂ²ÂµV
for instance, was an “academy” to cultivate the “ethical teachings of the 
school” by placing students within an environment in which they could 
FbOb¬8OOÂµ½bY½K½}bLÈ²½Âbµ­*µ½V¸ÁV¢ÁV¹Á ¢
In this section, I argue that several contemporary educational attitudes 
and conceptions marginalize or militate against the cultivation of intellec-
tual humility (and likely other virtues, too, though that further claim is not 
my concern here). This is a preparatory survey pending future investigation, 
and it is inspired by other “aretaic” criticisms of contemporary attitudes 
and conceptions (see, e.g., Battaly, 2013, and Cooper, 2008b). Though these 
attitudes and conceptions are diverse, their effect, both individually and col-
bO½ÈbËVµ8½²bb²µUo²µ½VnbYÂO8½8µ88²b8n²½}bOÂ½È8½
of virtue; second, of the ideal of educators as exemplars; and third, of the 
6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd   66 19-10-2015   15:15:37
Educating for Intellectual Humility ¹¸
b½b²²µbnbYÂO8½8µb8Fui8µ	8b}² µ¯ÁÏ¾V¢Áp¾ }bnÂ
}²8µbi8¬nÂY8b½8²b½8½­½É8²Y½bbO½Â8uYµ¢Ð½}Âu}
ËYµOÂµµ²bqbO½µ8µbOoOOOb²É½}}Â½Ë8Y½}b88ubb½
nOoYbObV½8uµÉ½}8µb½nÉYb²OOb²µ²8µbYFË½}b²O²½Oµ
nYb² bYÂO8½¢b½b nOÂµÂ nÂ² 8µbO½µ nYb² bYÂO8-
tion that I judge to militate against or marginalize humility as calibrated 
OoYbOb¢
,}bo²µ½8²bperformative conceptions of education that prioritize stan-
Y8²YÎbYbÊ88½n²§Â8½o8Fb§Â8½bµVµÂO}8µu²8Ybµ8YYÂb
pass rates, often to the exclusion of all else. Performativism marginal-
izes teaching for virtues in general, because it imposes, incentivizes, and 
entrenches a myopic focus upon cognitive qualities and achievements with 
obvious measurable performative criteria, in several ways. For a start, humil-
½ËµVb8ËÈ²½ÂbµVYnoOÂ½½§Â8½nË²¬b8µÂ²bV­µb½}uÐ²µ-
totle recognized when he remarked upon ethics being an “inexact science” 
(see further Kotzee, this volume). This being so, virtues like humility tend 
not to feature in the standardized lists of performative criteria for students 
½Â²µÂb8YbYÂO8½²µ ½ 8²½¢bÊ½VÉ½}b²n²8½ÈbbYÂO8½V
humility is only likely to be acknowledged insofar as it contributes demon-
strably to improved performance. This means that humility is valued only 
contingently and instrumentally, rather than as an independently valuable 
virtue and a component of good intellectual conduct. Finally, the invariably 
standardized character of performative education precludes the formation 
of the rich and personalized pedagogic relationships that the cultivation 
of virtues, especially via exemplary demonstration, properly requires (see 
Markie, 2008). Performativism is, then, hostile to educating for virtues in 
general, including humility.
The second are instrumentalist conceptions of education that direct cur-
ricular content and pedagogic practice toward the training of students with 
the skills and knowledge deemed necessary to national economic interests 
É}8½ 8bµ}½½Yµ8²8uuËYÂFFbY ½}b¬µb²ÈOb YÂµ½²Ë­OOb½
of education). Instrumentalism also marginalizes virtues, but incorporates 
88²½OÂ8²}µ½½Ë½}Â½ËVn²8½b8µ½½}²bb²b8µµ¢ bVbYÂO8½Èb
focus is placed on information, skills, knowledge, and dogmatic pedagogy 
²8½}b² ½}8 OÂ½È8½bY bÊObbObµn O}8²8O½b²i½}8½ µV È²½Âbµi8Y µ½Â-
dents are rewarded for their ability to rapidly and reliably absorb those 
cognitive skills, rather than their commitment to the improvement of their 
O}8²8O½b²µi½}bË ½b²8Îb88F½ ½FbObOu½Èb+Éµµ8²Ë
knives. Two, as recent history shows, instrumentalist educational systems 
tend to exclude or derogate the humanistic disciplines, such as history and 
philosophy, which are the natural and nourishing home of the projects of 
edifying self-education that are required if one is to aspire to and attain 
good ethical and intellectual conduct. The project of perfecting one’s intel-
bO½Â8OYÂO½Ybµ½qÂ²µ}É½}8bYÂO8½Èb8YµO8bÈ²-
ment dominated by rote learning of practicable skills dictated by concerns 
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about economic productivity. Three, the instrumentalist privileging of eco-
O8Y¬²8O½O8­bbYµbÈ½8FËOqO½µÉ½}½}bYb8Yµn½b-
lectual humility. For instance, there are, prima facie, good economic reasons 
½u²b½}b²b8µ8FbOoYbObnµOb½µ½µÉ}É8²n½}bbÈ²-
mental costs of carbon-intensive economic activities and of the mechanized 
form of the global food system. Four, instrumentalist education erodes the 
ideal of teachers as exemplars of virtue, since what a student expects is 
8bnoOb½½²8µ½½b²nÉbYubV8Y½}8½Ybµ½V  ½µbnV²b§Â²b
them to be exemplars of good intellectual conduct, much less the beautiful, 
“saint-like” sage described in the ancient virtue traditions.
Alongside the performative and instrumentalist conceptions, there are 
two further factors that are hostile to the cultivation and exercise of humil-
ity. The third feature of education hostile to humility is the contemporary 
zeal for the cultivation and protection of “passion” on the part of students 
concerning their beliefs and convictions. A cult of passion encourages 
88½½½ÂYbnÂn²½obY8µµ8½b OoYbOb ½}8½ 8obµ 8 µ½ÂYb½ µ¯
8ub½8OoYbObÉ}b8µÂnËu½}b²µµF½Ën²FÂµ½O²½O8
appraisal by either their peers or their teachers. In practice, this disables 
both the recognition-disposition and the regulation-disposition, in several 
É8Ëµ¢, µ½8²½V ½ µb8²8½bµÉ}8½8²²Ë ²8nÂ²½ ÁÏÏpV ¢ ¹p  O8µ 8
ideal of sincerity from an ideal of correctness, placing all emphasis upon the 
former to the neglect of the latter. If all that matters is the intensity of pas-
sion of one’s sincere belief that p, rather than the issue of p’s truth, then the 
Èb²ËYb8nOoYbObOY½µ½Fb²bOuÎbY8YnÂobYi8Y½}Âµ
n}Â½Ëiµµ½¢
The erosion of the ideal of correctness is, next, accelerated by the preva-
lence of relativism, constructivism, postmodernism, and other doctrines of 
“truth-denial,” as Bernard Williams dubs them (2002, ch. 1). If there are no 
truths to be accurate about, since all “truths” are “constructions” or “mere 
½²Â½}µV­½}b½}b²bµbbY½µÉb8½Èb²½}b²bOu½nOoYbOb
OY½µ ² ½}b ²buÂ8½ n ½bbO½Â8 OYÂO½¢ ² OÂY ½ 8b
any sense for education to instill in students a “fundamental orientation” 
toward intellectual goods such as truth: For no such truths exist toward 
which to be oriented, fundamentally or in any other way.
,²Â½}Yb8u}½½8b8²bµbOoOn²8Y½}µµVo8ËV½}b¬µO-
entistic” conviction that there are truths to be recognized and respected, but 
ËÉ½}½}bY8nµOb½oOÉbYub8Y§Â²Ë¢nµV½}bbÊOb½
OOb²u½}bYbÈb²8ObµnµObObVbO8FbbÈbi¬8µµ8½bË­8Y
¬µOb²bË­iÉ}8½bÈb²bbµVn²½}b²bµ§Âbµ½nOoYbObO-
cerning beliefs and convictions in the ethical, aesthetic, and other spheres of 
nb¢,}bµObnOoYbObV8YV}bObVn}Â½ËVµ½}b²bn²b²8YO8Ë
delimited, and the result is, in Wittgenstein’s words, that students come to 
suppose that “scientists exist to instruct them” in the realm of truth, while 
¬b½µ8YÂµO8µ­O8Ëb½b²½88Y¬uÈb½}bb8µÂ²b­iÉ½}
the result that the very idea that humanistic scholars and disciplines might 
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have truths of their own to convey “does not occur” (1980, p. 36). In such 
cases, humility is impaired either by the rejection of truth or by the restric-
tion of truth to the delimited domain of science, in a way that collapses or 
Oobµ ½}bF8µµ n² ½}bYµµ½µ ½ ²bOuÎb OoYbOb OY½µ
and regulate one’s conduct accordingly.
The fourth obstacle to the cultivation and exercise of humility are the 
practical realities of modern education, which create sub-optimal conditions 
n²bYnËubYÂO8½¢ FÈÂµbÊ8bµV½n88²½bbYµbOnËuV
include increasing class sizes, bureaucratization of educational practice and 
policy, top-down imperatives to be “relevant” or have “impact,” and the 
decline, especially in higher education, of one-on-one-teaching (see, e.g., 
Schuster and Finkelstein, 2006, and Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004). Doubt-
bµµbYÂO8½²µYnnb²b½OÂ½²bµ8YµËµ½bµÉ8YY½}b²ÉµbOoO
bêtes noiresVµÂO}8µ½}b*bµb8²O}ÊObbOb²8bÉ²½}b-¢¢Ð8
FbO½ ½ µÂO} YbÈbb½µ µ ½}b² bu8½Èb bnnbO½  ½b8O}ui½
least of how they render practically impossible the “constant Attention” 
8Y¬8²½OÂ8²Ð½½b½­½}8½ObÂYubYbµµb½8½8²b½8ObYÂO8½¢
Such pressures and constraints preclude the formation of the rich, trusting, 
and sustained relationships between students and their teachers and among 
teachers as colleagues. They also erode the edifying, humanistic conception 
of education as an arena for the cultivation and exercise of the virtues that 
are, for Plato and for Confucius, the grounds of social and civic life.
Such transformations, at least at the academic level, have a further nega-
tive effect and it takes the form of an increasing incredulity on the part of 
students to the very ideanbYÂO8½²µibO½Â²b²µV½Â½²µiFbubÊb8²µ
of good intellectual conduct that they ought to emulate. My sense is that 
most of my students regard my aspiration to good intellectual conduct as 
part-and-parcel of my role as a teacher of philosophy, but the closely related 
idea that they might, let alone ought, embrace the project of cultivating vir-
½ÂÂµOYÂO½µbbµ½½}b8µi½§Â½b38µÁÏÏ¹FV¢Ï i¬µÂµ-
pect” or, worse, “priggish.” The idea that education ought to edify, therefore, 
appears as a possible project to be considered by “student-consumers” fac-
ing a diverse menu of educational “options,” rather than an essential or 
½bu²8Ob½n½}bÂ²µÂ½n8qÂ²µ}u8YuYnb¢
These four obstacles to virtue in general, and to humility in particular, are 
Âµ½8µbbO½8Yi²8½}b²Yb²bµµuËiÈb²Ë8Ë²bOÂYFbYb½-
obYÉ½}²b8½Èbb8µb¢
b²½8n½}bµbFµ½8Obµ8²b}µ½b½È²½Âbub-
eral, such as performativism, while others, such as the “cult of passion,” are 
µbOoO8Ë}µ½b½}Â½Ë¢+ÂO}bYÂO8½8OOb½µ8Y8½½½ÂYbµ
u}½Yµ8Fb}Â½ËY²bO½ËVb²}8µFË8²½oO8Ë8²²Éu8µ½ÂYb½ µ¯
µbµbn½}b²8ubnOoYbObOY½µ½}8½½}bËÂu}½½²bµbO½V²
they might disable it indirectly by creating a wider social and educational 
culture within which educating for virtues appears idle, indulgent, “prig-
gish,” or eccentric and, thus, excluded from the moral imagination of those 
individuals and of their society.
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Interestingly, such concerns about education are often expressed using a 
charged rhetoric of corruption: of “the mission of humanistic scholarship” 
n²8²½}8ÂµµF8ÂÁÏÏV¢¾Ï ²nµO}8²µ¯µ½8½Âµ8µ¬OÂµ½Y8µ­
of a “complex intellectual inheritance” for Stefan Collini (2012, p. 199). 
These and other critics use this rhetoric of corruption to refer, at least partly, 
to the tendency of the educational systems they challenge to encourage 
8Yb8Fb8È8²b½Ënb½}O88Y½bbO½Â8ÈObµiË8Vµboµ}bµµV
On²½Ëi²8½}b²½}88O²²bµYuµb½nÈ²½Âbµ¢ µÂuubµ½ ½}8½Éb
might describe educational systems that are conducive to the cultivation and 
exercise of vices as corrupting, and those conducive to virtues as edifying.
My judgment is clearly that much of modern education is corrupting, at 
least as concerns the virtue of intellectual humility. I therefore align myself 
É½}ÂµµFÂ8V 
V 8Y ½}b² O½b²8²Ë O²½Oµ¢ ,}µ Ybµ ½V
of course, imply that students are thereby debarred from cultivating their 
virtues, since education is only one place where they can do that. But, of 
course, educational institutions will often be one of the best places for stu-
dents to learn to cultivate and exercise their virtues. If so, the corruption of 
such edifying spaces by performativism and related conceptions is a source 
n µb²Âµ OOb²ibµbO8Ë nV 8µ8²½bYbuub² ObÉ8²bYV ½}b
deep tendencies that are corrupting education are also busily corrupting 
many other areas of human life (see Cooper, 2002).
If these concerns are correct, then contemporary educational systems are 
n8uÉ}8½8ËÉ²½b²µµOb8½§Â½ËYb½obY8µbn½µ²8²Ë
purposes: to induct, inspire, and instruct students in the self-educative proj-
ect of cultivating and exercising the virtues that are integral to a good and 
qÂ²µ}unb¢YbbYV½}bn8O½½}8½O8µn²µÂO}bYnËubYÂO8½8²b8µ
historically familiar as complaints about the corrupting reality brings with 
½8²O8YYb²bµµuµbµbn}Â½Ëi½}µ½bVn}ÉÂO}½}b²b
µ½FbYb8YnYÂF½8FÂ½É}b½}b²ÉbO88µ²b½½}bOoYbOb
to do it.1
NOTE
 nnb²Ë½}8µ½²µ½nnb²Ð}µ½²2V8µ	8b}²V8ÈY¢
b²V
*ÂbË²ÂV	F*Fb²½µV+8²8}
bV8Y88ËÂµ²bnb²bbn²½}b²
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